Despite sustained feminist criticism, the production and consumption of pornography does not show signs of waning. Here, I offer a critical review of the existing feminist anti-pornography debate, arguing that it has largely failed to provide suitable grounds for a stable and comprehensive critique, instead often indirectly providing theoretical resources for pornography to reinvent itself. This is a product, in my view, of a misguided focus on the pornographic object. Feminist critics are better served, I argue, by redirecting their critical gaze towards the consumers of pornography, and, in particular, to the attitudes such consumption reflects. To that end, I introduce an alternative, attitudinal approach that enables criticism of pornography as a reflection of sexist attitudes, as well as for its role in concealing these attitudes.
Over the last 30 years, feminists have produced an impressive body of literature trying to build a case against pornography, all while pornography has become more pervasive and widely accepted. Recent figures show it to be a fast-growing industry boasting $13.3 billion in revenue in the USA in 2006 1 and where regular (male) use has become commonplace. 2 I attribute some of the failure of feminist critique to stem this growth to its focus on the pornographic object and the ongoing attempts to characterise what is wrong with pornography in terms of some feature (s) of the material. In addition to spawning seemingly endless and increasingly technical disputes, these approaches have unwittingly permitted various reinventions, adaptations and appropriations by a thriving pornography industry. Pornography has proved adept at repackaging itself in response to feminist critiques, with polished appeals to the legitimating rhetoric of choice, and casting pornography as healthy sexual expression that contributes to women's sexual (and economic) liberation. This paper aims in the first instance to bring attention to this dynamic and consider the feminist arguments alongside the responses they have prompted, and second, to sketch an alternative, attitudinal critique of pornography that is designed to avoid similar appropriation.
In support of the first aim, I begin with a critical review of the existing debate on pornography. My intention in this review is to suggest that standard feminist attempts to characterise what is wrong with pornography miss the mark, identifying contingent features and grounding only partial critiques. As a result, the pornographic industry (and its defenders) continually finds room to make correspondingly superficial adjustments (in its marketing or its theoretical pretext) that enable it to flourish despite feminist criticism. In this review, I consider the main themes and arguments that have formed the core of the debate and much of the academic literature on the topic. Three different approaches to understanding the wrongs of pornography are criticised: (1) highlighting the harm or suffering associated with pornography, (2) characterising pornography as a violation of certain rights and (3) the radical feminist denouncement of pornography as sex.
In the second part of the paper (sections §4-5), I offer an alternative characterisation of pornography's wrongs, one that directs us to the attitudes of consumers. This approach changes the object of our critique, abandoning the familiar attempts to identify some feature of pornography that is objectionable, and focusing instead on the nature of our attitudes as they are reflected in pornography. This redirection both better captures what concerns us about pornography and offers a characterisation that is resistant to appropriation by the pornography industry. However, this does not spell the end for a feminist critique of pornography as a social product. Pornography, I argue, is not a passive reflector of pre-existing sexist attitudes: it is the material objectification of sexism that plays a functional role in the concealment of those sexist attitudes from ourselves. Pornography is a mode of externalised sexism that provides a form of mediated domination and exploitation that bypasses the usual mechanisms of personal moral evaluation. In this way, pornography represents a significant obstacle to overcoming sexist oppression and should remain a feminist topic of serious concern.
There are four clarifications to make before continuing. First, while my discussion may provide new resources for advocates of censorship, the question of prohibition does not reflect my central interest in this paper nor inform my general approach. Moreover, the following analysis should not be taken to imply support for other legislative measures directed at the sex industry more broadly. I will offer brief comments regarding possible strategies at the close of Section 5, but for now note that legislative, regulative and carceral approaches to these topics (pornography and prostitution) have historically worked to control women's behaviour and sexuality, and to enable other harms.
3 Thus, a healthy scepticism of such measures seems due.
Second, I follow Jensen (2007) , in defining pornography in relation to the pornography industry and market, i.e. as the material supplied by adult entertainment corporations, made available on pornography websites, and consumed by individuals looking for pornography. Jensen admits this is not a precise definition but is sufficient to ground a 'working definition [of pornography as] the graphic sexually explicit material sold for the purpose of arousing and satisfying sexual desire ' (2007, 53) . 4 Third, the following critiques, including my own analysis, are best understood as critiques of heterosexual pornography, meaning material that is aimed primarily at the heterosexual (male) consumer. 5 This describes the vast majority of mainstream pornography and will be the most susceptible to critiques grounded in analyses of unequal gender relations and patriarchal oppression. This is not to say that at least some gay porn, for example, has not been criticised for the ways in which it reproduces oppressive gender norms, or that other categories are necessarily immune from any of the following critiques. 6 However, there are important differences that do complicate such analyses, and for our purposes, these categories will be put to one side. Finally, my review concerns objections to pornography grounded in feminist theory and advanced by anti-pornography feminists 3 See Lerner (1986) , Pateman (1988) , Brown (1995) , Bernstein (1999 Bernstein ( , 2012 and Bumiller (2008) . Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 4 This working definition is compatible with the fact that a significant amount of contemporary pornography is free to view, i.e. consumers do not purchase the material. Rather, revenue is generated by selling advertising space and commissions on directed web-traffic (see The Economist, 'Naked Capitalism, ' 2015) . 5 Such material may include homosexual acts, such as 'girl-on-girl' scenes, though these are framed with the heterosexual male viewer in mind. Moreover, while some surveys suggest there are increasing numbers of women viewing pornography, the current proportion of female viewers remains low. See Lykke and Cohen (2015) . 6 See Andrea Dworkin (1981) for a critique of male homosexual pornography as reproducing male power, and Richard Dyer (1985) for a nuanced defence of pornography in light of Dworkin's criticism.
(hereafter APFs). 7 Objections grounded for instance in moral conservatism will not be included. Importantly, APFs are a varied group, with diverse theoretical commitments. The following will not fully illustrate these differences, but should not be taken to imply that there is no disagreement. With these clarifications in hand, I turn now to the paper's first aim. In the following three sections, I provide an outline of three main approaches to locating the wrongs of pornography.
8 Importantly, the following is a thematic sketch rather than a comprehensive account of the varied and nuanced positions developed within these approaches. My intent is to illustrate the persistent obstacles these approaches face and thus motivate interest in pursuing an alternative. I begin with an analysis of the attempt to characterise pornography as wrong in virtue of its harms.
Pornography and harm
A popular approach favoured by APFs is to argue that pornography is wrong because it is harmful. In pursuit of this strategy, APFs have argued that pornography is harmful in three main ways: (1) harm is endemic to the production of pornography; (2) its existence increases the rates of rape and other violence against women and (3) that it supports and promotes gender inequality (economic, status or otherwise), contributing to women's subordination. 9 I will examine each of these claims and the responses they have received in turn.
Production of pornography requires harm
Some of the most damning criticism of pornography takes the form of horrific and heart-rending descriptions of the abuse and violence women have suffered in its production. This includes, for example, the story of former porn actress Linda Boreman (also known as Linda Marchiano), which is frequently cited in APF criticisms of pornography. Boreman famously claims her performance as a porn actress (for example, in the 1972 movie Deep Throat) was coerced as she was beaten and threatened by her then-husband into participating. 10 Boreman's story echoes wider worries about the exploitation, abuse, and coercion of women that continues in today's pornography industry. 11 There is recognition by various 7 I follow Eaton's (2007) use of the APF acronym. 8 For a related analysis along similar themes, see Finlayson (2016) . 9 Eaton (2007) offers a similar taxonomy of APF claims regarding the harms of pornography.
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See U.S. Dept. Justice (1986, .
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See for example, MacKinnon (1996 MacKinnon ( , 2005 , Farley (2006) , Jensen (2007) and Dines (2012b) .
groups (both pro and anti-pornography) that exploitation and abuse of vulnerable women does sometimes occur to produce some pornography, and that such harms constitute an unacceptable wrong. 12 A possible response however, is to deny that such harms are essential but rather are preventable, contingent features of the production of porn. Cases of cruelty and forced work are clearly wrong and intolerable, but with the proper regulation and oversight, such harms could be prevented (at least in theory); pornography does not require such coercion for its production. APFs can, however, reject the claim that regulation against trafficking and coercion are sufficient to address the above harms involved in the production of pornography. 13 Dines argues, for example, that the physical damage incurred as a porn actor is significant and unacceptable. This can include sexually transmitted diseases, for one, but other injuries are common as well. Dines (2012a) writes:
The now closed Adult Industry Medical Health Care Association, which was the Los Angeles-based voluntary organisation in charge of testing performers, had a list on its website of possible injuries and diseases to which porn performers were prone. These included HIV; rectal and throat gonorrhea; tearing of the throat, vagina and anus; and chlamydia of the eye. Not your everyday workplace ailments -unless, of course, you are a prostituted woman.
It is harder to argue that such injuries and infections are not integral to the production of pornography. Dines notes the contemporary mainstreaming of extreme pornography depicts acts that can only result in 'ravaged anuses and distended vaginas ' (2010, xvii) . Furthermore, it need not be only the hard-core acts that result in damage and injury, but simply the degree of 'use' that a sex performer's body is subjected to. Furthermore, while some progress has been made in protecting porn actors against the comparatively high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, 14 including 12 See Boyle (2011).
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Moreover, there is good reason to think the implementation of certain measures to target trafficking for instance, or domestic violence, may not only fail to address all the harms involved in the production of pornography, but often contribute to further harms. In particular, adopting a carceral approach to regulation and enforcement in cases of trafficking or domestic violence can increase vulnerabilities and further entrench relations of domination (Chapkis 2004; Agustín 2007; Doezema 2010; Bernstein 2012) . Thus, to the extent defenders of pornography depend on carceral measures to resolve the harms in its production, APFs have further grounds for rejecting this strategy.
14 One study of infection rates among "Adult Film Industry" (AFI) performers reports that the incidence of Chlamydia infections amongst AFI performers was 8.5 times higher than in Los Angeles County (LAC) residents (18-29 years old), and 34 times more than the general population; and Gonorrhea infections were 18 times higher than LAC residents (18-29), and 64 times higher than in the general population (Goldstein et al. 2011, 645-646) .
the legislation of the use of condoms in some US counties, (e.g. known as Measure B adopted in 2012 in Los Angeles), the porn industry fiercely opposed these measures and has largely circumvented them by relocating to areas without such requirements. The industry response to Measure B, in addition to warning of the financial losses, was to fall back on the favourite ideological workhorse of 'choice', evidenced by the following comments (offered during a press conference held by the 'No to Government Waste' Committee, which opposed Measure B):
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… the performers understand the risks they're taking -Jeffrey Douglas, Free Speech Coalition Board Chair I find it insulting that people are trying to legislate a law that implies that I'm not capable of calculating the risk myself and deciding that it's my choice to take what I see as the safer route because there's no such thing as safe sex, only safer.
-Stoya, AFI performer
The idea of restricting our ability to make choices of our own is insulting -James Deen, AFI performer
The industry appeal to 'choice' marks the issue to be about consent, which in a broadly liberal politico-legal context, will strongly favour an anti-paternalist presumption. Appealing to choice allows one to acknowledge that pornography may in fact require its performers to be harmed, however, such harms cease to be wrongs via the magic of consent. 16 As a result, APFs are then faced with the philosophically difficult and strategically alienating task of problematising women's choice. While this is not an insurmountable challenge, the legitimising power of choice in liberalism seems unlikely to diminish, and, given its central place in contemporary politics and political theory, I fear it will be a long while before that debate moves on. Liberalism, both as political theory and legal framework, will inherently struggle to appreciate the problems associated with choice. Consequently, we get comments such as the following from Ronald Dworkin:
… our economic system does, it is true, make it difficult for many women to find satisfactory, fulfilling employment, and may well encourage some of them to accept roles in pornographic films they would otherwise reject.
[…] There is
See Kernes (September 2012) . The press release was reported by AVN Media Network, an 'adult entertainment' media source.
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It also, according to Boyle, enables blaming the exploited for their exploitation (2011, 599) and the denial of responsibility.
great economic injustice in America, but that is no reason for depriving poor women of an economic opportunity some of them may prefer to the available alternatives (1993, 233) .
So, the claim that pornography requires harm in its production has been met with two responses: first, the direct coercion, rape and abuse associated with the production of pornography is not an essential feature and pornography can be produced without it; second, any remaining harms associated with the production of pornography cease to be wrongs thanks to the power of choice. Together, these responses mean it is unlikely that attempts to ground a critique of pornography in its harmful production practices, will prove successful. Moreover, while existing appeals to regulation and consent may be disingenuous, we can imagine a world with stringent regulation and oversight, paired with an ideology of choice that takes feminist concern into account, but that would still leave room for a pornography industry that closely resembles its current form. However, APFs would likely be unsatisfied with this result, and would be unconvinced that the problem of pornography had been eliminated. In light of these worries, APFs may shift focus, and point to other harms associated with pornography. The next section explores one such harm: the empirical claim that pornography causes rape and violence against women.
Causal connection to rape and violence against women
The claim that the wrongs of pornography lie in its causal connection with rape and other violence against women has been a popular one, and one that has been widely discussed in academia, social and experimental science, and legal policy. It was perhaps most famously advanced by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin as part of their proposed ordinances, which aimed to enable women to sue pornographers for damages tied to pornography-inspired rape and violence. 17 In their ordinances, MacKinnon and Dworkin focus on specific incidents in which a particular rape or assault was explicitly modelled after a scenario depicted in pornography (known to have been consumed by the offender). This strategy however fails to provide grounds for condemning pornography
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MacKinnon and A. Dworkin co-authored anti-pornography ordinances for Minneapolis (1983) and Indianapolis (1984) . The Minneapolis ordinance was passed twice by its City Council (in 1983 and again in 1984) , but both times was vetoed by Mayor Fraser. The Indianapolis ordinance was passed (by both City Council and Mayor Hudnut) but was later rejected by Judge Barker as unconstitutional. The model ordinance is reproduced in A. Dworkin's (1985) .
more broadly, as it does not assert a general causal connection between pornography consumption and rape. 18 As Eaton (2007) See Karen Boyle (2000) for a critique of the assumptions and methods used by researchers examining the causal link between pornography use and sexual violence, and the suggestion that further study along the 'effects model' is unhelpful for the anti-porn feminist project.
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See Lynne Segal (1993) for a summary of (1960s) research into the connection between pornography and social harms. See Vega and Malamuth (2007) for more recent work that demonstrates a correlation between pornography consumption and sexual aggression.
and sexual violence and (2) if it did have any such effect, it would at best be one contributing factor amongst several others.
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Limiting the causal claim to focus on explicitly violent pornography (i.e. material that expressly depicts rape, torture and abuse) has also proved unhelpful for APFs. In particular, it enables pornography's supporters to assert (and exploit) a distinction between the violence in pornography and the sex in pornography. 24 They then claim it is the depiction of violence that is the problem, not the depiction of sex. As Segal writes, reporting results from researchers Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod (1987) :
They further suggest, from experiments using imagery which is not sexually explicit but involves violence against women, that it is the violence rather than the sexual explicitness, which is mainly responsible for any increase in aggressiveness and calloused attitudes in men following exposure to violent pornography. (1993, 13) Just as violence in the production of pornography was excused as nonessential to pornography, the problem of violence in pornography is dissolved by suggesting it too, is non-essential. This view has been voiced by commentators who claim to share APF's condemnation of violent pornography, or at least the violence in such material, but who do not think this entails a general rejection of pornography. Rather, they claim, men can enjoy pornography without enjoying the depictions of violence. As two defenders of pornography write:
The sado-masochistic genre of pornography, particularly, is so comprehensibly degrading that we are appalled and shamed by its existence. Contrary to MacKinnon's view, almost all men, I think, are as disgusted by it as almost all women. (R. Dworkin 1993, 233) … men in general list violence as the least titillating aspect of pornography, react to it with distress rather than pleasure, and have become less, rather than more, tolerant towards violent pornography. (Segal 1993, 12) These sentiments are echoed in a recent study by Antevska and Gavey (2015) in which men confirmed the presence of violence and domination in the pornography they consumed, but claimed that it was not the 23 See Horvath et al. (2014) and Hald, Malamuth, and Yuen (2009) for a review of scientific literature on this subject. Hald et al. conclude that while exposure to pornography was shown to constitute a 'risk factor' in predicting sexual aggression, 'as has been well documented in the area of sexual aggression research, virtually all risk factors have only relatively small associations with the dependent variables of interest ' (2009, 6) . See also Eaton (2007) for a comprehensive review and analysis of the various empirical claims at issue.
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See Boyle (2000, 189) for a critique of how descriptions of pornographic material as 'violent' or 'sexually explicit' in empirical studies wrongly presume shared, and ideologically neutral, understandings of these terms.
domination or violence that appealed to them. Rather, they enjoyed the sexual, but non-violent, aspects of the material. So, while modern mainstream pornography may in fact include material that depicts aggression and is demeaning to women, the suggestion is that such violence is not essential, and that the men who find this material appealing do so in spite of its violence and problematic gender dynamic.
In sum, the empirical claim that pornography causes rape and abuse has been notoriously difficult to prove. Moreover, attempts to focus critiques on explicitly violent pornography, as the genre that is most likely to support allegations of a direct or legally salient connection with rape, runs into trouble. Specifically, it has enabled pornography's defenders to assert a distinction between the violence and the sex in pornography where the (inessential) violence can be condemned independently of the sexual component. Moreover, at best it would provide only a limited critique of pornography as not all pornography would be described as explicitly violent. As a result, some APFs have advocated abandoning this strategy. Karen Boyle, for instance, argues the complex mechanisms and individual agency involved in pornography's violence against women are simply not suited to scientific analysis. It is best, she advises, to recognise that '[i]t is impossible to prove that pornography -in any form -causes violence against women' (Boyle 2000, 193) and that further attempts to try only distract from and undermine more fruitful discussions.
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But perhaps a more complex causal claim that better incorporates knowledge of cumulative effects and variant behaviours would avoid these issues? In light of the above, some APFs have proposed a more nuanced approach that links pornography to wider social harms. Pornography (including material that is not explicitly violent) might not directly cause rape, but rather promotes and reinforces sexist attitudes that are expressed in a variety of behaviours and that contribute to gender inequality. 26 This claim is the subject of the next section.
Causal connection with gender inequality
Eaton (2007) argues that APFs should modify their allegation that pornography causes harm in two ways. First, in terms of the nature of the harm
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See also Jensen (1998) . Jensen argues that a scientific approach is often privileged over alternative methods for acquiring knowledge. He suggests insights from feminist epistemology lend support for adopting testimonial and narrative based methods instead.
26
Gender inequality here will include the problem of rape and sexual violence, but is not limited to these phenomena.
caused, and second, the type of causation at work. Eaton suggests that APFs should focus on how pornography works to shape attitudes that perpetuate and promote sexism and that contribute to gender inequality (which can include a higher incidence of rape and sexual violence towards women, but also includes economic inequalities, lower estimations of women's abilities, and pressure to conform to unequal gender stereotypes). Second, rather than direct or linear causation, pornography works indirectly and cumulatively, such that repeated exposure, together with other social factors, contributes to the reproduction of sexist attitudes and perpetuates gender inequality. Importantly, Eaton claims pornography should not be targeted as the sole or even primary cause of inequality, but is rather one factor amongst others, and, its effect is probabilistic, that is, 'exposure to pornography is neither necessary nor sufficient for its putative injuries but rather raises the chances of harm depending on context ' (2007, 715) . Taken together, Eaton argues that these points represent a sensible version of the 'harm thesis' that APFs would be wise to pursue. If one is attempting to prove an empirical connection between pornography and inequality, Eaton's particular formulation seems to be the best on offer. Furthermore, given its focus on inequality more broadly (rather than specifically rape or sexual violence), it is likely able to avoid the evasion strategy of trying to distinguish between violent and 'non-violent' pornography; the majority of mainstream pornography, not just the explicitly misogynistic material, will be suspect for its role in promoting sexism.
Eaton is careful, however, to highlight that the truth of this thesis may have only limited implications; even if it was proved, it would not necessarily be sufficient to justify the prohibition of pornography. This qualification hints at the first of two possible responses to the claim that the wrongs of pornography lie in its causal relations with women's subordination and gender inequality.
The first is that the harm potential of pornography has been so diluted that even if it were conclusively proved, it has been rendered uninteresting, or not a topic of serious worry. Many other materials and practices that together constitute and perpetuate inequality will be similarly indicted (e.g. representations of women in advertising, movies, and TV shows), and if pornography fails to play a particularly important role in that system, then there is no reason to single it out for critique. 27 While the
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These popular media representations of women are charged with reinforcing traditional gender roles and perpetuating harmful stereotypes. As Skipper notes, other problematic media can include women's romance novels and traditional children's stories (e.g. Cinderella) (1993, 728) .
suggestion that pornography only plays a small role in the perpetuation of inequality obviously does not exonerate it, it does dissolve the force of the criticism and practically diminishes its particular harms. The implication is that eliminating pornography would have an insignificant impact on the greater harms (i.e. inequality and sexism) that it is supposedly connected to. APFs are placed then, in a difficult position: if they propose that pornography plays a substantial role in gender inequality, they risk making too strong an empirical claim that frankly, is likely false. Too minor a role, however, risks the possibility that eliminating pornography would fail to undermine inequality.
The second worry about this expanded empirical hypothesis is the difficulty in actually proving it. Eaton's epidemiological approach is thoroughly scientific and highly technical. However, while the epidemiological conception of causation is better than other models for our purposes, the comparison with epidemiology has important limits; testing whether smoking causes cancer is fundamentally different from 'testing' how a contextually laden historical and social practice might affect attitudes and behaviours. Eaton overestimates the ability of science to quantify or interpret the influence of culture, practice and history. I do not think I am overly pessimistic when I express doubt that science will ever be able to conclusively prove any such connection to either side's satisfaction. The numerous and dynamic social factors and contextual meanings make a genuine scientific investigation impossible at worst, and at best, essentially contested and unlikely to produce conclusive results. Scepticism aside, APFs must at least wait until the evidence is in for this approach to function as a critique of pornography. Until such time as the hypothesis is confirmed, it can provide no support for a feminist critique.
Pornography and rights violations
The second popular approach is to argue that pornography contributes to the violation of women's right to free speech. This right is highly valued by Liberals and is often used to defend pornography. If successful, a critique of pornography grounded in the same right would present a powerful challenge to the industry and its supporters.
This approach has been developed in several ways. For MacKinnon, this takes the form of a violation of the right to free speech by silencing women (by discouraging women to speak, undermining the authority of their speech or causing their speech to be misunderstood). Langton (1993 Langton ( , 1999 famously argues that pornography (supported by the authority of the pornography industry) sets felicity conditions for women's speech. This, combined with how women's attempts to refuse sex are frequently ignored or disregarded in pornographic material, means they are unable to do certain things with their words, including refuse sex. Importantly, if pornography causes women's speech to be silenced or misinterpreted, women will be unable to fight the message of pornography with more speech.
The theoretical response to these various attempts has been, predictably, to dispute the content of the rights that APFs appeal to, or that the outcome leans one way versus the other when they are shown to conflict with other rights. R. Dworkin, for example, argues that MacKinnon and Langton's attempts to argue that pornography 'silences' women and can therefore be seen as a threat to women's freedom of speech, have misconstrued the right to free speech. He claims such arguments attempt to expand the content of the right to free speech beyond what is justified. He rejects such attempts as 'premised on an unacceptable proposition: that the right to free speech includes a right to circumstances that encourage one to speak, and a right that others grasp and respect what one means to say' (R. Dworkin 1993, 232) . Furthermore, he maintains that even if we did recognise such a right, it would be a positive liberty, which loses out when in conflict with the negative liberty of free speech.
This particular debate, of how the free speech of pornographers impacts the ability of women to speak, or as Langton argues, interferes with women's ability to do things with words (e.g. refuse sex), has generated astoundingly detailed and complex formulations of the right, discussion of which is easily perceived as unending. It seems the difficulty or the risk, in pursuing this strategy is that the proposed wrongs of pornography can be denied or eliminated by purely theoretical moves. Accusations that pornography violates the rights of women can be, and have been, met with counter-interpretations and formulations of the rights at issue, further obfuscating rather than revealing the wrongs. Furthermore, as the above debate shows, despite intense efforts by APFs, the pro-pornography interpretation of rights has stubbornly refused to yield, and I am pessimistic that APFs will achieve success on this strategy.
Views such as Langton's are limited in two further ways. First, they indict only a narrow range of material, i.e. material that depicts 'rape myth' scenarios, thus omitting a significant amount of pornography that does not depict ignored refusals or sexual violence. Second, by focusing on rights and consent, they are ill-equipped to critique pornography's role in the production of voluntary but unwanted sex, i.e. 'partnered sexual activity to which one consents but may not desire sexually or otherwise' (Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras 2008, 387). Such consensual but unwanted activity is prevalent, multifaceted, and likely produced in part by dominant sexual scripts and gender norms. 28 For instance, Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras report that consensual unwanted sex was tied to certain gender norms and coding categories such as 'Good Girlfriends Say Yes' and 'Once Yes, Always Yes' that 'lay the foundation' for unwanted sex. Moreover, these norms interact with a neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility to reproduce unwanted sex (Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras 2008, 395). 29 Such experiences are clearly problematic and, to the extent that pornography contributes to their production, it ought to be subject to feminist critique. In these cases, however, the problem is not one of not being able to do things with words, i.e. refuse sex, but with forming the intent to refuse against a backdrop of patriarchal notions of sexuality. 30 Perhaps MacKinnon's claim that pornography discourages women's speech describes this phenomenon, though it too offers dubious grounds for a critique. On the issue of voluntary but unwanted sex, it risks criticising women's choices, understandings of their sexuality, and the value of their consent. I do not deny that there are important problems here, but again, this focus is misdirected. Moreover, it is unlikely that rights-discourse in general, and in particular liberty-rights to free speech, will be useful in drawing out these issues. 
Pornography as sex
The final approach to critiquing pornography is associated with the radical feminist critique of pornography as the subordination of women. This approach was most famously advanced by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, both of whom argued that pornography does not simply depict or represent women's subordination, but rather is subordination itself. This is in fact the definitional feature of pornography for MacKinnon and Dworkin, as evidenced in their often-cited definition of pornography as 'the graphic sexually explicit subordination
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See Drouin and Tobin (2014) , Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras (2008) and Walker (1997) .
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That is, women resisted a victimized description of their experience, which Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras suggest may be tied to their presumption of a victim/agent dichotomy.
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There is a significant body of literature on the nature and conditions for genuine consent, some of which could speak to some of the issues raised for example in Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras' (2008) study.
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It is unlikely, for instance, that rights-theorists would be willing to accept that individuals have a right to have their speech encouraged.
of women, whether in pictures or in words … ' (MacKinnon 1987, 176) . This view is built on a related critique of sex and sexual representation. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, sex must be evaluated within the context of the sexist, patriarchal society that gives it its meaning. In this context, sex is an act of male domination and violence, and of women's subjugation. Furthermore, given how pornography is used or is intended to be used, (i.e. as a masturbatory aid) MacKinnon and others argue that pornography should be thought of as sex, not just the depiction or representation of sex.
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This has not been a particularly popular nor successful approach, due in part to the difficult and polarising views on sex that it puts forward. MacKinnon's claim for example, that pornography is sex diverges significantly from popular opinion and runs up against the general reluctance to condemn sex. Moreover, feminists and liberals had worked hard to loosen the conservative grip on female sexuality and the related censorship of homosexual material, work that seemed threatened by adopting the outwardly 'anti-sex' radical feminist view. 33 These worries were amplified when MacKinnon and Dworkin joined forces with powerful but morally conservative (religious) groups in their fight to prohibit pornography, a move they were highly criticised for. 34 In an effort to distance themselves from the repressive views of sex associated with conservatives, and avoid the charge of being 'anti-sex', some APFs, and many liberals, advocate distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' pornography. 35 The 'bad' pornography is that which depicts violence and subjugation, eroticising gender inequality and abuse, while 'good' porn (or erotica) may promote egalitarian sexual relations, or at least, does not explicitly eroticise violence and misogyny. Moreover, feminists such as MacKinnon and A. Dworkin will be hard-pressed to reject at least the possibility of such a distinction, given the dependence of their rejection of pornography on the social and contingent meaning of sex. There is clearly room within their view for the claim that sex need not be inherently degrading or demeaning, and that perhaps, with the right social changes, could be dissociated from its misogynistic past. Moreover, given their view that 32 MacKinnon writes '[w]ith pornography, men masturbate to women being exposed, humiliated, violated, degraded, mutilated, dismembered, bound, gagged, tortured and killed. In the visual materials, they experience this being done by watching it being done. What is real here is not that the materials are pictures, but that they are part of a sex act. The women are in two dimensions, but the men have sex with them in their own three-dimensional bodies, not in their minds alone. ' (1996, 17) .
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See Boyle (2000, 193) .
34
See Strossen (1993 Strossen ( , 1114 Strossen ( -1116 . 35 See for example, Eaton (2007) and Power (2009). through its use, pornography becomes sex, it seems possible that the right kind of pornography could contribute to changing that meaning.
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The response then to the attempt to characterise the wrongs of pornography in terms of the immorality of sex has been to deny that sex is ubiquitously or necessarily degrading, a response that once accepted, opens the door to a repackaging of pornography as a member of that good fight. Modern soft-core pornography has capitalised on this opportunity, casting itself as an instrument of sexual liberation. Even further, sex, and pornography, are touted as vehicles for women's emancipation, both economically (by offering career choices) and personally (as a way to feel good about oneself). The claim then that pornography is sex, and sex is women's possession and inequality has been met with a sustained (and highly successful) counter-marketing campaign pushing the message that some sex, and some pornography in fact offer liberation, economic freedom and an outlet for women's power.
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In sum, attempts to condemn pornography in light of the harm it causes or requires, its violation of certain rights, or the wrongness of sex under patriarchy, face significant challenges, and have enjoyed little success. Attempts to pin the problem on harm only directs us to find ways to maintain the practise while appearing to address or dissolve these harms (via regulation or consent). Efforts to characterise the problem as rights violations spawns obfuscating debates that try to reconcile rights that necessarily conflict, generating novel justifications for why some rights trump others, or haggling over the content of key rights and who possesses them. Finally, radical feminist attempts to equate pornography with sexuality in the context of patriarchy runs up against resistance to condemn all sex, coupled with the suggestion that 'good' porn could help liberate sexuality from its patriarchal meaning. This is not to say that these challenges cannot be overcome, but the obstacles are considerable and in the interim, the APF critique lacks a solid foundation. I suggest that continuing to focus on these approaches will likely motivate further unsatisfying responses that fail to provide a stable critique.
In the remaining sections, I outline an alternative, attitudinal approach to understanding the wrongs of pornography. I suggest that by turning our attention from the pornographic object (including its content or method of production) to the attitudes of its consumers, APFs can find novel grounds for a sustained critique of pornography.
Reflections of sexism
As hinted above, the mistake, to my mind, has been to try to ground a critique of pornography in some feature of the object, rather than recognise that what is fundamentally problematic is the attitudes pornography evidences. In particular, I am concerned with attitudes, understood as 'associations between objects and "evaluative knowledge"' (Brownstein 2017) , of sexism, i.e. the association of women, as social objects, and negative evaluations. Such attitudes may be held explicitly or implicitly and may be expressed via a variety of behaviours, including sexual violence or prejudiced acts that perpetuate gender inequalities.
In the remainder of this paper, I sketch an attitudinal critique of pornography. This approach enables criticism on two levels: first, we can critique the misogyny and sexism expressed in the consumption of some pornography, and second, we can critique pornography's role in the concealment of sexist attitudes. I begin with a brief explanation of the first level of criticism, then devote the remainder to the development of the second.
First, turning our attention to attitudes permits a straightforward critique of consumers of explicitly degrading, abusive and misogynistic pornography. It is reasonable to suggest that consumers of this material share the problematic attitudes it expresses towards women and that, in these cases, a consumer's 'taste' for this material can be read as evidence for his deeply sexist views. 38 In other words, we can read the consumption of such material as an explicit endorsement of these views. Recall that the challenge has not been demonstrating a correlation between consumption of explicitly violent and degrading pornography and sexist and misogynistic attitudes; the difficulty has been implicating pornography as a cause of these attitudes. We can, however, sidestep these difficulties by changing the object of our critique. Redirecting our attention to these attitudes themselves, expressed by the consumer of pornography, both avoid the difficulties experienced by the strategies described above and more correctly identifies the problem. Moreover, harbouring such attitudes is likely to lead to sexist behaviour, which can include rape and sexual violence, but also acts of discrimination or degradation that reproduce 38 Importantly, as Saul argues, we cannot accuse pornography of objectifying women, rather the ability to treat a pornographic object as a woman requires already having objectified women, echoing the point that the problem lies in the porn-consumer (2006, 59).
gender inequality. Thus, an attitudinal critique can readily provide grounds for concern about the existence of such explicitly misogynistic material -it reflects a set of clearly problematic set of attitudes held by its consumers. The second, and more interesting, criticism aims for a broader indictment of pornography, and in particular, to help ground a critique of attitudes associated with soft-core (or 'non-violent') pornography -a category that APFs have struggled to condemn. Such material is often described as being 'just' about sex, and, as discussed above, its consumers claim the ability to isolate and enjoy only the sexual content (rather than abuse). I will not try to argue that such reports are false or disingenuous, but rather, even if true, that such consumption does reflect problematic attitudes, and moreover, exploration of how they are problematic reveals an important function of pornography: pornography may not cause the attitudes that concern us, but it does not passively reflect them either. Importantly, pornography conceals sexism and interferes with our ability to recognise and confront our own sexist attitudes. 39 Thus, the following aims to establish two key points: first, that consumption of pornography (including mainstream or 'soft-core') reflects sexist attitudes, and second, that pornography functions to conceal these attitudes.
To establish the first point, I return to MacKinnon and Dworkin's approach. MacKinnon and Dworkin argue that porn should be recognised as sex itself, and that sex under patriarchy is the subordination of women. This approach encountered resistance, counterintuitively rendering all sex as oppressive, and enabled the casting of pornography as a medium for changing the meaning of sex. I suggest a subtle but significant modification of this approach: rather than equating porn with sex, compare porn to the buying of sex, i.e. to prostitution.
The wrongness of buying sex depends in part on the meaning of buying a sex worker 40 -it is a social practice that adds another textural layer to sex 39 This includes claims made by viewers of objectively 'hard-core' or violent pornography, that it is not the violence, but the sex that is appealing (as discussed in Section 1.2). In other words, it will include the supposedly 'non-violent' elements of otherwise violent pornography.
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There is some disagreement regarding the terminology that ought to be used to describe sex work and those who sell sex. Some terms, such as 'prostituted person' (used for instance by Farley (2006)) emphasises the prevalence of harm done to women in the sex industry, though also denies women's agency by casting them as the 'done-to' and neglects differences between individuals and the multiple reasons they may have for selling sex (Agustín 2007) . Others, such as 'sex worker' have been criticised for normalizing an oppressive practice as 'simply' another form of work (MacKinnon, while 'prostitute' has a history of negative associations and is rejected by sex workers as derogatory (Jeness 1993) . See also Bernstein (1999, 111) and Sutherland (2004) . I here employ the term 'sex worker', though I do not take this to mean that 1) the only issue regarding sex work concerns labour regulation and working conditions, rather than also engaging with the meaning of sex under patriarchy and the attitudes of customers, itself and has a long history with clear links to the domination, exploitation and degradation of women. As with pornography, prostitution has been subject to numerous criticisms, though to clarify, my aim is not to show that pornography's wrongs lie in the ways in which it echoes the familiar wrongs identified in prostitution (exploitation, violence, harm, gender inequality) -this would simply push the problems back a level. And, unsurprisingly, criticisms of prostitution face many of the same obstacles facing critiques of pornography. 41 I will not argue that pornography just is prostitution. 42 The aim here is to highlight the attitudes that characterise the practice, and then to show how these can be connected to, and ground a critique of, the attitudes associated with consumption of pornography.
Attitudes associated with prostitution
Interestingly, though prostitution has been studied in detail, there is relatively little information on the attitudes and attributes that characterise the men who buy sex workers. As several studies observe, this may reflect the prevailing assumption that male 'demand' is natural and inevitable, and therefore not in need of study. 43 A further problem lies in the difficulty in gathering data, as Farley writes, 'it is impossible to accurately estimate how many men in the world have bought women for sex: they hide ' (2007, 4) . However, the few studies that have examined the attitudes of these men (often referred to as 'johns') are revealing. 44 Unsurprisingly, there were straightforward reports of explicit objectification of women, male superiority and dominance, and outright misogyny. Consider the following accounts:
Tricks confirmed that the relationship in prostitution is one of dominance and subordination: 'Prostitution says that women have less value than men'. Another explained: 'Guys get off on controlling women, they use physical power to control women, really. If you look at it, it's paid rape. You're making them subservient during that time, so you're the dominant person. She has to do what you want'. (Farley 2006, 123) or 2) that sex work cannot be harmful or dominating. By describing sex work as work, I leave open the possibility that sex workers exercise varying degrees of agency while also (as in other forms of gendered and racialized work under capitalism) being subject to exploitation, domination, alienation and violence. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for prompting this point.
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See Bernstein (1999 ), Farely (2006 ), and Farley (2007 for an account of the harms associated with sex work.
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See Tyler (2015) , MacKinnon (2004) and Whisnant (2004) for critiques of the supposed distinction between pornography and prostitution. I generally agree with their positions, though am arguing for a different approach here.
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See Raymond (2004) .
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Clients of prostitutes are also known as "tricks" or "kerb crawlers".
One trick graphically explained what he did in prostitution as 'renting an organ for ten minutes'.
[…] Women in prostitution became 'something for him to empty himself into, acting as a kind of human toilet'. (Farley 2007, 9) In addition to these clear cases of hostility and domination, the studies also examined more complicated attitudes men had towards the women they used, or that enabled their activities. For example, many johns believed their treatment of the women was justified or permissible in virtue of having paid: many men who buy sex believe that 'buying sex entitles them to do anything they want', or that paying 'gave them the right to inflict any kind of assault they chose' (Farley, Macleod, et al. 2011, 2-3) . 45 This highlights the further dimension of subjugation that the buying of sex contributes -it helps in the objectification of the women, supports a feeling of entitlement, and legitimises abuse: as one john explained ' … she gave up her rights when she accepted my money' (Durchslag and Goswami 2008, 18) . 46 Many johns also showed a lack of empathy, evidenced by their false belief that the women frequently enjoyed the encounters, 47 as well as the particularly chilling finding that many johns confessed awareness that the women they used were likely trafficked, abused and exploited by their pimps, but this did not stop them from continuing to buy sex from these women.
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Recent studies of online forum posts such as Punternet are similarly revealing. 49 Holt and Blevins, for instance, note that johns crudely objectify sex workers by ranking their appearance along a 'streetwalker scale' (344) which is compared against a scale used to rank women who are not sex workers. On the basis of a similar study of online brothel reviews, Tyler and Jovanovski conclude that the reviews do not demonstrate care or concern for the women: 'it is clear that narratives of care and concern for women in brothels are largely absent … the dominant narrative
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See also Durchslag and Goswami (2008, 18) . 46 Durchslag and Goswami also report that some men perceived the women's loneliness or vulnerability as an opportunity for greater domination or abuse (2008, 17) .
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For the purposes of the study, Farley, Macleod, et al understood empathy as 'the accuracy with which men who bought sex described the experiences of actual women in prostitution' (Farley, Macleod, et al. 2011, 7) . They reported that men estimated that the prostitute was having positive feelings 45% of the time during their sessions. We compared their judgments about what women feel during prostitution with a different study in which women in prostitution were asked the same question […] Only 9% of the women in Kramer's (2003) study indicated that they had positive feelings during prostitution. (2011, 7) 48 See Farley, Schuckman, et al. (2011, 22-24) , Durchslag and Goswami (2008) and Coy, Horvath, and Kelly (2007, 24) .
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Punternet is an internet site that enables johns to share reviews of prostitution 'services' and engage in discussion forums. See Blevins and Holt (2009) and Sharp and Earle (2003) .
around these [instances of questionable consent] was one of annoyance and anger with the women for providing a "poor service" ' (2018, 16) . These reports are perhaps unsurprising, though worth taking seriously. As these initial studies show, buying sex is frequently associated with a sense of entitlement, a lack of empathy, the ability to disregard exploitation and abuse, and the desire for domination and the experience of power over another. Clearly, these attitudes are deeply problematic and represent a significant obstacle for ending sexist oppression.
Moreover, many disapprove of the attitudes that johns have towards women.
50 While johns may brag to each other about their knowledge and activities, they do not want others to know they use women in prostitution. They recognise that the wider public, including their family members, employers, etc. decidedly condemn such behaviour and the men who engage in it. As several studies have discovered, one of the most feared deterrent strategies for johns is the publication of their names or other exposure. 51 Importantly, this condemnation is not reserved only for those johns who violently abuse women or demand acts deemed 'hard core', rather, the public contempt is for all johns in virtue of their sexist attitudes. In other words, 'soft core' johns are disapproved of as well -the defence that the encounter is just about sex simply is not believable in the context of prostitution. 52 Moreover, it seems johns also value having their sexist attitudes concealed from themselves. Many expressed preferences for a 'girlfriend experience' wherein the woman's behaviour and attitude make the john feel as if the sex was not being paid for. They often criticised women who did not seem to be enjoying themselves and thus ruin the illusion. Holt and Blevins thus suggest, quoting Holzman and Pines, that while seeking paid sex, johns 'do not want to deal with someone whose demeanour constantly reminded them of this fact ' (2007, 347) .
Many 'john schools' (programs aimed at changing the behaviour of men who have been arrested for solicitation) include attempts to increase empathy for sex workers and include talks by women who worked in the sex trade. See also Brooks-Gordon and Gelsthorpe (2003) for an historical account of societies' characterisation of johns, and in particular, the negative associations that developed in the modern and post-modern eras.
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See for example, Farley, Macleod, et al. who write, '[m] ost of the men (78-86%) said that they would be deterred by public exposure such as having their photos or names posted on the Internet, in the local newspaper, or on a billboard' (Farley, Macleod, et al. 2011, 8) . See also Durchslag and Goswami (2008, 24) and Coy, Horvath, and Kelly (2007, 15) .
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While there have been even fewer studies that examine the intersectional dimensions of men's attitudes towards women, I think it fair to suggest that the problematic attitudes associated with prostitution should be understood as informed by racism and heterosexism. See (Raymond 2004 ) for a brief discussion of the influence of race, class and nationality on the meaning of buying sex, and Jensen (2007) for a discussion of the overt racism in mainstream pornography.
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See also Pettinger (2011) .
While the above studies are not conclusive, they give good reason believe that the practice of buying sex workers is generally characterised by attitudes of domination, indifference, misogyny, entitlement and sexism. 54 Moreover, being a john is widely thought paired with these attitudes, which are generally condemned. The question now, and the subject of the following section, concerns the connection between the attitudes we clearly recognise as problematic when associated with prostitution, and the attitudes I want to associate with consumption of pornography.
Attitudes associated with pornography
I suggest that we should think of pornography as an externalised form of prostitution, specifically, as a practice that allows an externalised expression of the attitudes associated with prostitution. Pornography represents an alternative and more complex mode of expression of the domination, exploitation and objectification tied to prostitution. The direct, personal expression of these attitudes has been outsourced and industrialised, streamlined and made more efficient. There is a sense then, in which it is correct to say individual consumers do not express the attitudes in question, at least not in the usual direct or personal manner. But there is another sense in which this is a radically incomplete picture. The attitudes expressed in prostitution have developed a more sophisticated means for expression, i.e. via the pornography industry. This industry functions as a middle-man, introducing a layer of distance between the practice of prostitution, and its consumers: it is prostitution-by-proxy. But this does not mean that it is only individual pornographers who now express these attitudes on behalf of consumers -it is not simply a division of attitudinal labour. It is the invention of a particular mechanism resulting in altered relations: the attitudes associated with buying sex workers are embedded in the practiceresulting in an alienated form of sexism. Thus, prostitution and pornography are productively linked and cater to, and cultivate, the same 'consumer needs'. I suggest that many of the same attitudes associated with buying a sex worker remain present, though expressed via different behaviour, i.e. consumption of pornography. This seems true for at least one attitude identified in prostitution, i.e. the lack of empathy, which has been associated with the consumption of 54 Importantly, while these claims do rely on scientific studies, this does not entail they are subject to the same worries directed at the strategies discussed in section one. They are less problematic in virtue of avoiding claims about causation.
pornography. In the case of prostitution, johns were frequently aware that the women they used were exploited, abused and living in fear, but this knowledge did not prevent them from using the women regardless. Similarly, there is general awareness that women are trafficked, exploited and abused in the production of pornography, though this knowledge is disregarded in favour of continued consumption.
55 As Antevska and Gavey report, 'the primary mode of engagement with potentially troubling questions about women's role within pornography … was one of detachment ' (2015, 6) . Granted, the indifference expressed by pornography consumers may seem less inhuman than that expressed by johns who are more directly confronted by a potentially trafficked or exploited woman, though this is a difference in degree, not in kind. Moreover, that pornography enables individuals to disregard and express indifference to exploitation that they otherwise would not (by introducing a layer of distance between consumer and consumed) should be even more concerning to feminists. This characterisation of pornography is compatible with the claim that many consumers of pornography do not feel as if their consumption expresses sexism. As Antevska and Gavey (2015) note, many pornography users do not recognise their behaviour as expressive of a desire of power and domination, demonstrative of a lack of empathy, or indicative of their objectification of women. Moreover, these users may genuinely disapprove of these attitudes, and recognise their connection with prostitution: in other words, they support the general view that men who use women in prostitution have unacceptable attitudes deserving of contempt. However, it seems possible to lack conscious awareness of an attitude that is held and operates subconsciously. Introspection is a famously unreliable means for discovering the subconscious attitudes one holds. As recent work on implicit bias has shown, 'residual' sexism or racism, for example, can (and does) lurk in our unconsidered, habitual and reflexive actions, covertly guiding our responses despite our conscious and sincere rejection of sexist or racist views. 56 Alternatively, pornography-consuming behaviour could be explained as the result of unreflective adoption of the near-ubiquitous male practice. That is, there may be little opportunity to consider whether one's consumption expresses sexism, as well as little motivation to do so. It can be unpleasant to think of one's actions as expressing attitudes one rejects, and unlikely that one
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See Jensen (2007, 92-95) for a related discussion of how producing or enjoying mainstream pornography requires a manifest lack of empathy.
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See Saul (2013) and Valian (1998) for introductions to the workings of implicit bias.
would be prompted to do so in a world with pervasive male porn-consumption. 57 So, the fact that pornography consumers do not believe they are sexist, and do not feel that their consumption expresses the sexist attitudes that they consciously reject, is not itself a conclusive reason to think that their consumption does not express sexism. Moreover, it seems plausible that consumers of pornography implicitly hold sexist attitudes similar to those associated with using sex workers, though that are expressed via an alternative behaviour, namely their consumption of pornography.
Pornography as concealment
We may turn now to the final aim of this paper, to advance the claim that pornography not only reflects sexist attitudes, but also functions to conceal and hence enable such attitudes. As discussed above, pornography consumption can be understood as an alternative way of expressing the attitudes associated with buying sex workers. I now suggest the altered relations pornography provides are no accident, but rather a fundamental feature of the system, and a central part of pornography's appeal. Men are aware of the social disapproval of johns and may share this sentiment, or they may find the idea that they are indifferent to, or even enjoy, the degradation of women, unpleasant or uncomfortable; there is motivation then, to not think of oneself as a john. Consider for example, reports from a recent study by Farley, Schuckman, et al. (2011) comparing the attitudes and habits of 'sex-buyers' and 'non-sex buyers', where nonsex buyers were still users of pornography.
58 Non-sex buyers generally condemned johns: 'Those men [who buy sex] are not a real reflection of the real population … those men are dirty, controlling, not responsible,
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I am appealing loosely here to 'single-process' models of behaviour. Such models, in general, understand the influence of attitudes on behaviour as mediated by control, defined in terms of having the opportunity or motivation to deliberate. For examples of such models see Fazio (2009) and Petty, Briñol, and DeMarree (2007) . Antevska and Gavey (2015) for instance suggest that pornography consumers experienced few opportunities to reflect on their consumption, and, they suggest, some seem to avoid such reflection when prompted.
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They cite data from two studies on pornography use suggesting anywhere from 24 to 52% of collegeage men in the United States use pornography less than once a week (Farley, Schuckman, et al. 2011, 10) . The data here does vary widely, with some studies failing to differentiate between male and female frequencies, or using subjective terms such as 'frequently, sometimes, often' rather than 'weekly, daily', etc. (Carroll et al. 2008, 12 pornography is a prominent feature of the current emerging adulthood culture. Pornography use was particularly prevalent among emerging adult men, with nearly half reporting that they viewed pornography at least weekly and about 1 in 5 reporting that they used pornography daily or every other day. (2008, 23) not honorable', and described them as 'losers, unethical, or desperate' (Farley, Schuckman, et al. 2011, 21-26) . These statements indicate that non-sex buyers perceive their own activities (consumption of pornography) as relevantly dissimilar in attitude to that of sex buyers. Sex buyers, they believed, hold offensive attitudes towards women, that presumably, they did not think their use of pornography expressed. This is perhaps best revealed in their responses to the direct question of why they choose not to buy sex. The responses that Farley, Schuckman, et al. highlighted include:
'I want to think of her as a whole person, rather than simply a body.' and 'I am a sexual being, but it is not a turn on for me knowing that the other person needs to be coerced, no … It is not like you can just grab a rubber doll -a person is still a person, and you need more than just that physical thing … ' Another non-sex buyer said, 'I don't want to feel like I am using a woman, and if I feel that way, I
am not going to enjoy it'. (Farely, Schuckman, 2011, 32-33) Importantly, the above responses cite how the buying of sex would make them, as the sex-buyer, feel, or how the buying of sex would interfere with how they would like to think of the act. Again, while these non-sex buyers choose to not buy sex, they do choose to consume pornography, implying that their consumption does not make them feel like they are 'using a woman'. It seems possible, widespread even, to genuinely condemn the attitudes associated with men buying women, and believe that consumption of pornography does not express these same attitudes. It is this conjunction that pornography enables and thus conceals expression of sexist attitudes. It does so in part by providing a powerful new dimension of anonymity: it provides a way of expressing sexism such that others do not judge you as sexist (as they might if you were labelled a john), but also such that the consumer does not recognise their sexism either. Pornography allows one to buy sex without feeling as if you are someone who buys sex. In a way, it is similar to the 'girlfriend experience' valued by posters on Punternet who value paid-for-sex that does not feel like paid-for-sex. By externalising the direct expression of these attitudes to a separate sphere, consumers avoid the unpleasant phenomenology of domination and are enabled to think well of themselves. Pornography then, allows consumers to avoid confronting the women they use as well as what their own attitudes are towards women. Importantly, this effect is not solely a product of the media forms pornography takes (and thus the physical distance that is introduced), but also the altered mode of consumption that the industry makes possible.
Consumers for instance avoid a number of interactions including 'negotiating' a price for desired acts, using one's own force to push beyond what was agreed, and paying.
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The above does not demonstrate that consumers are necessarily complicit in domination, nor that they are morally responsible for the attitudes in question. My focus here is more limited: it is to introduce a more complex understanding of how attitudes can be expressed, and how this grounds a better account for how to connect sexist attitudes and pornography. Moreover, this analysis can be extended beyond the producers and consumers of pornography. Individuals who do not consume pornography personally, but who do not see anything wrong with it, can be similarly characterised as harbouring the kinds of attitudes that concern feminists. Producers and consumers are of course essential for the continued existence of pornography, (i.e. the manifestation of sexism in the form of pornography) but the reactions, or lack of reaction from others is just as concerning.
Pornography, then, can be seen as a means by which problematic attitudes are expressed, and, where the very form of expression contributes to their opaqueness to consumers. Herein lies the grounds for continued feminist interest in pornography: pornography may not cause sexist attitudes, but the structure of its production and consumption effectively conceals sexism. Moreover, it effectively conceals sexism even from those who otherwise support gender equality. The externalisation of sexism undermines efforts to understand how it informs our everyday lives and our ways of thinking -it enables us to wrongly think of our practices as innocent leisure, of our desires as harmless rather than oppressive. Admittedly, the above only introduces the grounds for an alternative critique, much more work is required to develop the position. In particular, pornography's role in concealing sexist attitudes calls for further study. This is however, clearly an important mechanism to investigate, both with respect to its specific manifestation as pornography, as well as with an eye to identifying other, similar, devices or practices. Feminists need a better understanding of the machinery of such concealment, and ultimately, to find ways to challenge consumers' understanding of their activities.
Initial evaluation and further remarks
I have argued that the central problem with porn lies in the attitudes of consumers, which I have suggested should be associated with the 59 It is not uncommon to have access to free pornography that is funded via advertising revenue. sexism, domination, and exploitation expressed by johns buying sex workers. Moreover, recognising pornography as a form of externalised prostitution directs our attention to its function in concealing these attitudes. I also maintain that this attitudinal critique is immune to appropriation by the industry or other defenders of pornography, in particular, to some of the practical or theoretical moves described in sections §1-3. First, my view is not susceptible to attempts to differentiate between violent porn and 'non-violent' porn: as discussed above, even 'nonviolent' pornography expresses deeply problematic attitudes associated with prostitution. Second, one cannot argue that the right kind of pornography could contribute to changing these attitudes. On my view, pornography only reflects and conceals certain attitudes, it does not cause them, and therefore cannot be enlisted in support of feminist aims. As others have already argued, it lacks the requisite causal power. Third, pornography is not simply one form of sexist expression amongst myriad others (e.g. portrayals of women in media, film, and other social imagery) and therefore undeserving of any special interest. Rather, pornography is a particularly insidious social practice that functions to conceal and normalise sexism. It is not one more class of objectionable depictions of women, it is the continuation of prostitution by other means. The mechanism by which pornography conceals sexism is both different in kind from how social representations of women perpetuate sexism, and as mentioned above, is deserving of close study.
I would add here a brief note concerning 'erotica' and 'egalitarian' pornography, genres that some feminists want to exclude from the standard criticisms of pornography. 60 One might argue for example, that porn produced under fair conditions and relations of respect (i.e. does not utilise domination or exploitation in its production) will not reflect the problematic attitudes associated with prostitution, and will therefore not be subject to the attitudinal critique. This conclusion though is too quick and misunderstands the reflective dimensions of pornography. Pornography is a social practice that reflects prevailing attitudes tied to the meaning of buying sex, there is no direct correspondence between the attitudes expressed by an individual producer and those taken up by its consumers. Moreover, it's unclear that pornography produced under even the best conditions will necessarily be consumed with egalitarian intentions. See for example, Eaton (2007) , Kennedy, Kimmel, and Llewellyn (2013) .
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Gail Dines provides an example of such appropriation in her (2008) . There, she describes the Abbywinters.com booth at a pornography exhibition, a website that marketed itself as women-centred, 'featuring women with no makeup, no fake boobs, no airbrushing', and featured booth 'girls' who even played Lynne Segal touches on a related point: Commenting on the failures of early attempts to prove direct causal relations between exposure to porn and violence, she attributes this failure to the fact that the meaning of an image to a group and to an individual is unpredictable, and depends greatly on its context of receipt. She notes that '[m]en together can, and regularly do, pornographise any image at all -from the Arab woman in her chador to any coding of anything as male and female (nuts and bolts, for example) […] Context really does matter ' (1993, 15) . 62 And the relevant context for us, is not one characterised by egalitarian attitudes. Egalitarian pornography cannot isolate itself from the wider meanings associated with prostitution. Despite good intentions, I do not think egalitarian pornography nor 'sustainable' prostitution can change attitudes, rather they will likely be consumed through the prevailing inegalitarian lens and work to obscure implicit sexism even further.
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It is important to note that the externalisation of prostitution as pornography may not be an entirely negative development. The outsourcing of direct expression of domination and exploitation may provide distance that enables porn consumers to adopt conscious views on gender equality, despite those ideas not yet finding expression in subconscious action. The very mechanism that provides distance between the consumer and the direct expression of attitudes of prostitution, allows consumers to come to view them as wrong. It does not ensure men will come to support gender equality, or to condemn the attitudes expressed in buying sex, but it does provide the space for such views to gain a foothold. It is difficult to develop respect and empathy for women while actively and directly engaged in their exploitation and domination through prostitution. Pornography offers exploitation by proxy whereby individuals can avoid becoming desensitised to direct domination, and from their more distant vantage point, be better able to recognise and condemn sexism and misogyny in its more obvious forms. In this way, pornography could even be recognised as a positive development that contributes to chess with their fans 'to show that the girls were smart as well as sexy'. When it was 'show time' however at the booth, with four female couples kissing and caressing for the overwhelmingly male audience […] Just as at the other companies on the floor, men with all varieties of cameras and cell phones ringed the booth, vying for the best angles to record images of women being sexual.
While Dines notes that these girls likely had better working conditions that those employed in other pornography companies, and that the material did look different, 'the men who were watching behaved the same as other fans on the convention floor'.
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See also Rea (2001) for further discussion of how context may affect whether an object should be described as pornographic.
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See Raymond (2004 Raymond ( , 1163 for discussion of the 'sustainable prostitution paradigm'. changing men's attitudes. Importantly, this effect is not the result of pornography's content, but rather the altered relations and perspectives that it makes possible.
But we should not be too quick to celebrate pornography's 'progressive' potential. As noted above, pornography simply makes a shift in thinking possible, it does not guarantee that this shift will happen, nor that attitudes will necessarily shift in the right direction. There is a very real danger that the concealing effects of pornography work to support the current view that consumption of pornography does not express the attitudes associated with prostitution. Even more concerning, that consuming porn does not feel like domination to its consumers may encourage a shift to the view that therefore prostitution does not feel like expressing domination either, lending support for increasingly normalised and legitimised sex markets. In my view, this is categorically the wrong direction. Resisting this trend depends on having a correct understanding of how pornography expresses problematic attitudes, how it conceals these attitudes, and how it can enable shifts in thinking. There are likely numerous forms such resistance could take, and I will not be able to explore these possibilities here. I will reiterate my suggestion made at the start, that I do not think this resistance ought to take the form of legal prohibitions or carceral regulation. In addition to their dubious historical credentials, these measures are also ill-suited to changing attitudes. 64 More suitable resources may be found in forms of non-violent, democratic resistance that prompts us to reflect on our attitudes and the ways in which they are expressed.
Conclusion
The production and consumption of pornography does not show signs of waning. Moreover, male use of pornography is assumed to be ubiquitous and natural, where pornography's appeal is taken as given (rather than in need of explanation), and male consumption needs no defence. This state of affairs exists despite sustained efforts by APFs to argue against porn and to demonstrate its wrongs. Pornography's resilience in the face of this critique could be read as simply another example of the limits of philosophy, a sad illustration of the practical inefficacy of academic argument. APF arguments, like many other philosophical arguments, cannot change behaviour on their own, and cannot enforce uptake. The problem 64 I acknowledge that legislation could have symbolic force which may help support attitudinal change, but do not think it can be the primary mechanism.
however, is more substantial -as I have argued, APFs have indirectly provided the resources for pornography to reinvent itself, evade feminist criticism, and become mainstream. This is a product, in my view, of a misguided focus on the pornographic object. As an alternative, I have suggested APFs redirect their critical gaze towards consumers of pornography. As MacKinnon writes, '[w]hatever goes on in the mind of pornography's consumer matters tremendously ' (1987, 223) . The misogyny, degradation, and sexism visible in pornography reflects the problematic attitudes held by its consumers, and its consumption can be analysed as an expression of these attitudes. This attitudinal analysis however, does not require us to abandon critical study of the pornographic object. Importantly, as a material social product, pornography actively functions to conceal sexism, distancing the consumer from the women he consumes, as well as from awareness of his sexist attitudes. In this way, pornography enables the appearance of progress with respect to professed attitudes towards women, while effectively masking sexism and circumventing the mechanisms that prompt critical reflection. Finally, this attitudinal critique should be thought to complement, rather than compete with, the existing critiques -that is, a focus on attitudes is compatible with pornography also being wrong or harmful in the ways identified. It can supplement these views with an analysis of the adaptive capacities of sexism to avoid and obscure such critiques, and thereby support new grounds for opposing pornography.
